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Condemnation of Low Income 
Residential Communities Under 
the Takings Clause 
J. Peter Byrne* 
Many and varied voices today are calling for narrowing the 
scope of "public use" in the Takings Clause. In doing so, they 
primarily seek to limit, in varying degrees, the constitutional au-
thority of government to use eminent domain for urban redevel-
opment. For critics, found both on the right and on the left, easy 
recourse to condemnation unduly diminishes the regard due pri-
vate property or permits monied interests to leverage govern-
ment power for their own ends. The critics have been successful 
in recent years, as several state courts have narrowed their inter-
pretations of public use in their state constitutions. A striking 
example is Michigan, where the state supreme court recently 
overruled unanimously its "notorious" Poletown decision and 
held under the state constitution that a local government could 
not condemn land in order to turn it over to a private developer, 
even if the initiative would advance the public interest by creat-
ing many jobs and expanding the tax base.! Now the U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that eminent domain may be used for 
economic redevelopment under the federal Constitution, at least 
in some circumstances, but popular backlash threatens a crude 
legislative response.2 
Although the critics have raised some valid concerns, the limi-
tation of public use advocated and, to some extent, accomplished 
seems wrong-headed. In this paper, I choose as my focus con-
demnation for urban redevelopment of residences of low income 
people, whether modest homeowners or renters. There are sev-
eral reasons for this choice. Advocates for limiting eminent do-
* Professor Of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This paper was sub-
stantially completed several months before the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
Kelo v. City of New London. 
1. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
2. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
131 
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main often invoke the harms suffered by low income urban 
residents when their homes are bulldozed.3 Poor residents, often 
ethnic or racial minorities, historically have disproportionately 
suffered from condemnations and seem vulnerable in the local 
political process. While I agree that such residents deserve addi-
tional legal protection, I think that the critics have grasped the 
wrong end of the problem in advocating strengthened substan-
tive judicial oversight of the purposes of redevelopment projects. 
Low income residents would be better protected by improving 
the procedures required before eminent domain may be used, 
and by changing the interpretation of "just compensation," than 
they would be by limiting the meaning of public use. Under-
standing the resulting losses and contrasting them with those of 
other landowners whose property might be condemned also 
seems important for assessing the fairness or justice of using emi-
nent domain for economic redevelopment. Eventually, such a fo-
cus also may help to clarify what types of losses through eminent 
domain should raise constitutional concerns. 
Local governments need broad powers of eminent domain to 
survive, and to support their poor residents in the competitive 
economy of the 21st century. Indeed, it seems likely that adopt-
ing most interpretations of public use advanced by property 
rights proponents would aid land investors and harm poor re-
sidents. Such measures would not protect any defensible under-
standing of property rights. 
In Part 1 of this paper, I describe the evolution of interpreta-
tion of the "public use" clause that authorizes the use of eminent 
domain for urban redevelopment. In Part 2, I chart the effort to 
narrow the scope of public use in order to eliminate or police 
redevelopment by condemnation. In this part, I present and ana-
lyze the arguments for such reinterpretation and the new rules 
suggested for how public use should be understood. I also sketch 
the changing economic and political situation of cities that lead 
them to take this activist approach to positive economic plan-
ning. I conclude that courts cannot justify limiting condemnation 
through policing the purposes for which condemnation is sought. 
In Part 3, I argue for expanded procedural protections before 
3. The NAACP, along with the AARP and others, filed a brief amicus curiae in 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo, arguing that permitting eminent domain for eco-
nomic redevelopment "will disproportionately harm racial and ethnic minorities, the 
elderly, and the economically underprivileged." Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP, et 
aI., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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condemnation can deprive people of their homes. I also argue 
for the justice of changing our interpretation of "just compensa-
tion" to pay homeowners for the psychic and community losses 
they suffer through displacement. 
I. 
PUBLIC USE FOR ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT 
Current controversy has revived ancient debate about whether 
the term "public use" in the Takings Clause limits government 
from using condemnation for economic redevelopment. During 
the 19th century, courts debated whether the term required gov-
ernment (or the public in some other incarnation) to actually use 
or occupy the expropriate~ property.4 Courts that required ac-
tual use and possession by government were plainly concerned, 
as a matter of political or legal theory, that it was unconscionable 
for government to take property from one private individual and 
give it to another.5 This is the same intuition that drives courts 
today. Later, I wish to examine how weighty a consideration it 
should be, at least when the prior owner is compensated. But 
most courts in the past were not at all consistent, as courts gener-
ally found that the necessity for assembling land for canals and 
railroads and other projects owned by private actors persuasively 
justified the use of eminent domain.6 
Courts were not driven to this narrow view by either the lan-
guage or history of the Takings Clause. As many courts recog-
nized in the 19th century, the term "use" in common speech 
could just as well mean purpose or benefit.7 Moreover, the 
founding generation seems not to have been troubled by con-
cerns or debate about the types of projects or goals for which 
eminent domain could be used. Early state courts that had fash-
ioned limitations upon what a public use could be struggled to 
accommodate condemnations where a private person would own 
the expropriated land, such as the Mill Acts (permitting lower 
private mills to build works that flood upstream land of another) 
or railroad and canal construction, because they saw such mea-
4. See generally, DAVID DANA & THOMAS w. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 
(Foundation Press 2002). 
5. The classic quote is by Justice Chase: "[A] law that takes from A and gives to 
B" Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798). Calder was not an eminent domain case 
and did not involve compensation. 
6. See, e.g., Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry., 208 U.S. 598 (1908). 
7. E.g., 1 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1st ed. 
1828)(meanings of "use" include "advantage" and "production of benefit"). 
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sures as vital to a growing economy. Such courts answered the 
objection to forcing transfer of property to a private person by 
emphasizing either that the public might use the property (as in 
traveling with a private common carrier) or that the public would 
benefit from the private transfer; mills, railroads and canals were 
accessible to the public and created economic growth that bene-
fited all. 
But it appears more likely that the term "public use" was never 
intended to act as any restraint upon the power of eminent do-
main at all. In a careful analysis of the original understanding of 
the term, Matthew Harrington concluded that the term was de-
scriptive rather than prescriptive.8 After looking at English and 
colonial condemnation practices, early state constitutions, 'and 
the drafting history of the Fifth Amendment, he found that "the 
drafters did not intend to impose a substantive limit on congres-
sional expropriations [but] intended to distinguish a certain type 
of taking which required compensation (expropriations) from 
those which did not (taxes and forfeitures)."9 If this view is right, 
as it seems to be,lO the power of eminent domain should be lim-
ited by the standards of the Due Process Clause to the same ex-
tent as any legislative authority. This would give coherence and 
weight to the Supreme Court's modern but otherwise unstable 
equation of the scope of the power of eminent domain and of 
police power.ll 
8. Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the 
So-Called "Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 1245 (2002). Harrington's quibble 
with the term "Takings" Clause stems from his insistence that it should be called the 
"Compensation" clause because it was intended to require compensation, not to 
limit a power the Framers viewed as inherent in legislatures. [d. at 1286-87. This 
view has sometimes been expressed in the regulatory takings debates as well. 
9. [d. at 1248. 
10. Dean Treanor has noted that the first state constitutions did not require com-
pensation but only that the property owner or the legislature consent to the expro-
priation. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings 
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 789 (1995). Harrington 
argues persuasively that the framers of these early constitutions probably believed 
that legislative control of the eminent domain power would protect citizens from its 
arbitrary employment. 53 HASTINGS L. J. at 1276. 
11. Thus, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) equates "public use" with the 
scope of the police power, justifies it on the deference courts owe to legislative judg-
ments, but Harrington's analysis gives historical and textual reasons for the equa-
tion. Scholarship claiming a literal, restraining meaning for "public use", seems to 
aggressively interpret vague references against highly-colored claims of background 
commitment to largely unviable property rights. See Eric R. Claeys, Public Use 
Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 4 MICH. ST. L. REv. 878, 898-901 (2004). 
HeinOnline -- 23 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 135 2005
2005] LOW INCOME RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITIES 135 
The law has developed, however, on the assumption that "pub-
lic use" provides a firm but vague standard for substantive review 
of eminent domain decisions. Thus, state court decisions looked 
in different directions on different facts, with many odd and in-
consistent distinctions.12 
Remarkable, however, has been the consistency of the United 
States Supreme Court, which never has found an exercise of emi-
nent domain to violate the public use requirement.13 Early on, 
the Court eschewed any reliance on a "literal" reading of "public 
use."14 Moreover, in many of these older cases the Court upheld 
exercises of eminent domain which had as their palpable pur-
poses economic development and in which the condemned prop-
erty would end up in private hands with little or no public 
access. IS The Court justified its deference to state and local de-
terminations of public use based upon the great variety of needs 
and conditions across the country.16 
States continued to construe their own versions of "public use" 
in a variety of ways. An important 20th century milestone was 
the acceptance of the idea that eminent domain could be em-
ployed for slum clearance, even if the property would be given to 
private developers for more valuable development, because the 
removal of "blighted" properties was itself a "public use."17 This 
12. See DANA & MERRILL, supra, note 4, at 193-98. 
13. In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896), the Court 
set aside as violation of the Due Process Clause an order of a state agency requiring 
a railroad to allow private parties to build a grain elevator on the station grounds, 
but emphasized that the order was not nor was claimed to be an exercise of the 
power of eminent domain. See also Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 
241 (1984). 
14. See, e.g., Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 
(1906)("inadequacy of use by the public as a universal test")(per Holmes, J.). 
15. Strickley, 200 U.S. at 532; Clark v. Nash 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Fallbrook Irriga-
tion Dist v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); see also Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 
U.S. 9 (1885)(limiting holding to conflict of rights among riparian users, but noting 
statutory purpose to secure "the advantages inuring to the public from the improve-
ment of water power and the promotion of manufactures"). 
16. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 705-06 (1923); Clark v. Nash, 
supra, 198 U.S. at 367-68. 
17. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E. 2d 153 
(1936). The courts viewed slum clearance as an aspect of public health, a perspec-
tive that had much influence on the mistakes of urban renewal. The Muller court 
wrote about slums: 
The public evils, social and economic of such conditions, are unquestioned and 
unquestionable. Slum areas are the breeding places of disease which take toll not 
only from denizens, but, by spread, from the inhabitants of the entire city and 
State. Juvenile delinquency, crime and immorality are there born, find protection 
and flourish. Enormous economic loss results directly from the necessary expendi-
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approach was entirely consistent with progressive thought of the 
time, in its faith in scientific planning and modern design. But at 
the same time, it withdrew legal protection for the property inter-
ests of poor residents to an exceptional degree, since the houses 
of better off people would not be blighted, almost by definition. 
Berman v. Parker,18 decided 50 years ago next month, marks a 
decisive break. Giving a green light to ambitious urban renewal 
plans in Southwest Washington DC, the unanimous Court 
equated public use with the police power, essentially denying 
constitutional limits on the ends to be served by eminent domain, 
and embraced deference to legislative judgments about choice of 
means or details already well established in the Court's interpre-
tation of the Due Process Clause. The urban renewal that fol-
lowed represents the largest concerted effort to stem the tide of 
urban economic decline in our history, and left an ambiguous 
legacy that colors appraisals today of the deferential approach to 
interpretation of public use. 19 Many persons, disproportionately 
black and poor, lost their homes, and the public housing, high-
ways, and commercial development that replaced them often 
have been seen as representing a sterile and socially naIve ap-
proach to urbanism. It is useful to note that urban renewal on 
this grand scale ended because of legislative decisions ending 
federal subsidies, protecting residents, and requiring prior con-
sideration of historic and environmental resources.20 
Midkiffl adds little to the applicable principles, beyond the 
adherence of three current justices. The Hawaiian legislation in 
the case, which empowered certain categories of leaseholders to 
buy the fee interest in their residences through an indirect emi-
nent domain scheme, was adopted to some extent to provide tax 
protection to the selling owners, and imposed only abstract losses 
on the prior owners who were in no sense singled 'out. The deci-
ture of public funds to maintain health and hospital services for afflicted slum 
dwellers and to war against crime and immorality. Indirectly there is an equally 
heavy capital loss and a diminishing return in taxes because of the areas blighted 
by the existence of the slums. 
[d. at 254. 
18. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
19. See Nicole Stelle Garnet, The Public Use Question As A Takings Problem, 71 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 946-48 (2003). 
20. Statutes that curbed the excesses of urban renewal and related highway con-
struction include the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.c. 470, et seq., Sec-
tion 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 3303{c}, and the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.c. 4321, et seq. 
21. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
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sion affirms the broad scope of public purposes that could be 
served and the nearly complete deference that courts should pay 
legislative determinations that condemnation further some con-
ceivable public interest.22 Perhaps, it is significant that the ad-
vantage to the public at large here was entirely economic, i.e. to 
improve the competitive functioning of the private land market, 
while Berman also contained some aesthetic and humanitarian 
purpose.23 
So one could reasonably assume by the mid-1980's that sub-
stantive public use review in federal courts was as etiolated a pro-
vision as substantive due process review in economic cases or 
commerce clause limits on federal legislation. "Today, nearly all 
courts have settled on a broader understanding that requires only 
that a taking yield some public benefit or understanding. This 
22. Midkiffs formulation on these points is stark. A takings need only be "ration-
ally related to a conceivable public purpose." 467 U.S. at 241. Likely success in its 
goals should not be required: "empirical debates over the wisdom of takings ... are 
not to be carried out in the federal courts." Id. at 243. 
23. The language of two additional Supreme Court decisions seems to drive 
stakes into the heart of any restrictive reading of public use. In Ruckelshous v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), the Court rejected an argument that a federal statute 
forcing the manufacturer of a pesticide to publicly disclose a trade secret did not 
serve a public use, even though "the most direct beneficiaries" of the requirement 
were the manufacturer's competitors who could avoid "costly duplication of re-
search and streamline the registration process, making new end use products availa-
ble to consumers more quickly." Id., at 1014-15. The Court affirmed that the 
requirement need have only a "conceivable public character" and that determina-
tion of the "optimum amount of public disclosure to the public is for Congress, not 
the courts to decide .... " Id. 
Equally dismissive was Nat R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston and Maine Corp., 503 
U.S. 407 (1992), involving a public use challenge to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission's order to one private railroad to convey to another ownership of a stretch 
of track, based on findings that transfer would enhance Amtrak service over the 
tracks because the transferee would maintain the condition of the track better than 
the transferor. The Court noted the similarities to Midkiff and Berman, in that 
"condemnation resulted in the transfer of ownership from one private party to an-
other, with the basic use of the property by the government remaining unchanged." 
[d. at 422. The Court proceeded to apply the settled law, "[T]here can be no serious 
argument that the ICC was irrational in determining that the condemnation will 
serve a public purpose by facilitating Amtrak's rail service. That suffices to satisfy 
the Constitution, and we need not make a specific factual determination whether the 
condemnation will accomplish its objective." [d. at 422-23. 
Both cases arguably involved some more concrete use of the condemned property 
by the public than do economic redevelopments. Ruckelshous approved public dis-
closure of information that, at least in theory, could be used by any member of the 
public, and National Railroad Passenger facilitated use by a publicly controlled com-
mon carrier. But neither opinion hinted at any consideration of such a formalistic 
approach to public use, and emphasized only the advancing of the public interest. 
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reading equates public use with "public interest."24 The leading 
scholarly analysis of public use, then and now, by 'Professor 
Thomas Merrill, found that federal decisions since Berman had 
uniformly found a public use, although the state courts were 
somewhat less consistently deferential.25 Merrill thought this de-
velopment acceptable both because of the inability of courts to 
ground limits on the legislative power on principle and because 
the risks of misuse of eminent domain were rather low, given the 
preference of government to buy property consensually and 
avoid the added costs of litigation and political contention. 
Nonetheless, he worried about the risk of private actors hijacking 
the eminent domain process when the owner accorded the prop-
erty a higher "subjective" value than the market, as may occur 
with residences or established businesses. 
II. 
REVIVAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 
ABOUT PUBLIC USE 
In this section, I want to consider and critique the renewed 
efforts to restrict the constitutional meaning of public use. The 
cases and arguments are interesting, but the case for stricter 
reading is seriously flawed in logic, doctrine, and empirical as-
sessment. This section attempts to state the arguments for nar-
rowing public use, other than unfairness to the poor, and show 
their weaknesses. The following section then concentrates on the 
effects of condemnation for urban redevelopment on the poor 
residents who are displaced. 
One preliminary point should be made, which is obvious but 
rarely remarked upon in these debates. State and local govern-
ment entities are bound by state statutory definitions of "public 
use," typically incorporated into authorization for the use of emi-
nent domain. Courts that hold that certain projects do not 
amount to a constitutional public use are not merely correcting 
some errant local government or special purpose public entity, 
but narrowing the scope of authority of the state legislature to 
define when eminent domain is appropriate. The Michigan Su-
24. DANA & MERRILL, supra, note 4, at 196. 
25. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORN. L. REV. 61 
(1986). Merrill's case survey has been updated, with entirely consistent results, in 
Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and 
Trends, 1986-2003, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TRUST J. 251 (2004). 
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preme Court in Hathcock,26 for example, not only set aside the 
actions of Wayne County, but expressly found that the Michigan 
legislature had misread the state constitution in authorizing the 
county to use eminent domain to achieve any "public purposes 
within the scope of its powers for the use or benefit of the public 
..•. "27 Not only should state legislatures be afforded deference 
in interpreting the meaning of public use, but concerns about 
specific abuses of power by local entities can be addressed politi-
cally by amending statutory authorizations. Wholesale with-
drawal of constitutional authority is not the only remedy. 
The battleground for public use can be understood to be the 
circumstances where owners attach a large value to their proper-
ties in excess of what they can receive under just compensation. 
These concerns are crystallized in the notorious Poletown28 case, 
where the divided Michigan Supreme Court upheld a taking by 
the City of Detroit of an entire neighborhood, 465 acres, consist-
ing of homes for 4,200 residents, as well as several schools and 
churches, to provide General Motors (GM) with a site meeting 
its specifications for construction of a new factory. Plainly 
anguished, and applying a higher standard of review than 
Berman,29 the Court held that providing a site for a privately-
owned factory, given the economic crisis into which Detroit had 
plunged, constituted a "public use" under the state constitution. 
The dissenters, and many critics, charged that the taking had 
been for the private gain of General Motors, with only incidental 
employment benefits for the people of Detroit. Justice Ryan, in 
his dissent, although acknowledging the unprecedented eco-
nomic crisis facing Detroit, denied the relevance of Berman and 
argued that the Michigan constitution permitted condemnation 
of land for a new private owner only when it would be used as an 
"instrumentality of commerce" or in a "slum clearance."3o 
Poletown casts a long shadow. Memorialized in film and 
books?l the anguish of the people whose modest but functioning 
26. County of Wayne, 684 N.W.2d at 765. The court first held that the proposed 
condemnation for economic redevelopment was within its statutory authority before 
it held that this exceeded the authority granted by the Constitution. 
27. Michigan Compo Laws §213.23 (2005). 
28. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W. 2d 455 (1981). 
29. The Court required that the City show that there was "substantial proof that 
the public is primarily to be benefited." ld. at 459. 
30. ld. at 477. 
31. Jeanie Wylie, Poletown: Community Betrayed (1989); Poletown Lives! (Docu-
mentary film produced and directed by George L. Corsetti, 1983). A brief but more 
balanced account of the controversy is provided by the Jenny Nolan, "Autoplant vs. 
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neighborhood was destroyed to create a site for a plant for the 
world's largest corporation seizes the moral imagination. The 
auto plant, moreoever, never fulfilled Detroit's expectations for 
employment. The Court's decision has been a regular element of 
the first year Property class since it was decided in 1981. Stu-
dents invariably express outrage that the government could in-
flict such harm on innocent people. That sense of outrage stands 
also behind the litigation effort that has now succeeded in over-
turning the judicial imprimatur. But most people have misdiag-
nosed the problem. 
First, arguing against use of eminent domain for redevelop-
ment by simply invoking Poletown states a non-sequitor. The 
case would have seemed quite different if the land for the GM 
plant had been vacant and held for speculation. In such an in-
stance, there would be no suffering from displacement nor un-
compensated loss to residents from the destruction of their 
community. Investors would have been compensated fully for 
the market value of the property. At the same time, cities need 
the eminent domain power to assemble large sites if they are to 
compete with greenfield sites for economic development. Such 
authority not only allows them to serve their residents, but also 
provides some brake on urban sprawl. 
Second, the case would have seemed equally tragic if Poletown 
had been taken for a publicly-owned facility with less economic 
value than a large privately-owned factory, such as a convention 
center or football stadium. There are numerous cases where 
communities the size of Pole town have been bulldozed for urban 
highways.32 These highways are not more clearly in the public 
interest than a factory. But in none of these cases would the 
property owners have had a colorable claim that the project did 
not amount to a public use. The goals for such transportation 
projects nearly always include economic development. 
Finally, the justices of the Michigan Supreme Court agreed 
that the Poletowners would not have had a public use claim if 
their neighborhood plausibly could have been characterized as 
blighted.33 Yet they would have lost all the community associa-
Neighborhood: The Poletown battle," The Detroit News, available at http://info. 
detnews.comlhistory/story/index.cfm?id=18&category=business (last visited Febru-
ary 16, 2005). I am indebted to Professor John Mogk for this reference. 
32. For a classic account, concerning the condemnation of 1500 apartments for 
one mile of the Cross Bronx Expressway, see ROBERT A. CARO, POWERBROKER: 
ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK, 850-94 (Vintage ed. 1975). 
33. Poletown Neighborhood Council, 410 Mich. at 663-664. 
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tions and way of life, and GM could have been given the land. It 
might be said that a finding of blight provides a substantive crite-
ria for condemnation, which lessens the chances that the taking is 
being done at the behest of a private party, but that simply rele-
gates rent seekers to preying upon the poorest and least politi-
cally connected segment of society. As we have seen, blight is a 
socially constructed understanding of urban decay which rests on 
a doubtful analogy to a gangrenous limb and more closely de-
scribes a degree of disinvestment that can be addressed directly 
and without amputation.34 Most American cities today contain 
vibrant historic districts that not long ago were considered 
blighted. 
Arguments for imposing new substantive standards on legisla-
tive bodies to satisfy the public use requirement reflect a deep 
and perplexing inconsistency. What should trouble us about 
Poletown is not primarily the benefit to GM, which could have 
located its plant in the rural South, but the deliberate destruction 
of a living neighborhood, with all that entails. The benefit to GM 
may deepen the condemnees' sense that the government power 
displacing them is beyond their control, which certainly can en-
hance the pain. But if government officials are making a good 
faith, reasonable judgment that Detroit needs this plant for em-
ployment, and there is not another site, then the purpose for the 
decision seems no more objectionable than a taking to site a 
highway or prison. The reality is that attracting a large, new au-
tomobile factory creates entirely plausible and substantial eco-
nomic benefits for a community. 
The harms suffered by the property owners seem largely unre-
lated to the faults that the courts find with the condemnations. 
Whether a redevelopment proposal likely will achieve the results 
that a city plans for does not address the loss suffered by a home-
owner who must relocate to another community. The home-
owner would suffer just as much if the land was taken for a road 
or a prison, instances in which no court is willing to second guess 
the judgment of the condemnor as to whether the project is justi-
fied or where it should be located. Moreover, it seems perverse 
for the constitutional rule to encourage the government to retain 
ownership of and manage the housing or stadium project when 
34. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The 'Public Menace' of Blight: Urban Renewal and 
the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. AND POLICY REV. 1 (2003). 
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most believe that the private sector can better manage low in-
come housing and sports venues, let alone automobile factories. 
The view, that there is something seriously wrong about the 
consensus essentially eliminating substantive restrictions on com-
pensated takings, starts with Professor Richard Epstein.35 The 
litigation effort to restrict eminent domain by a stricter interpre-
tation of public use has been spearheaded by public interest lib-
ertarian law firms that also have long been active in regulatory 
takings cases. The Institute for Justice created the Castle Coali-
tion to press this issue and has publicized its work.36 Plainly they 
respond to and invoke the losses suffered by small homeowners 
who must leave their homes and communities of many years, a 
loss that just compensation might never heal nor even attempt to 
heal, as discussed below. Small business owners also often can-
not recover all their losses through constitutionally adequate 
compensation. The focus of their concern seems be that private 
interests will hijack the government's power of eminent domain 
through influence or corruption to obtain property either that 
they could not otherwise obtain or at lower prices than would be 
agreed to in a consensual transaction. For them the necessity of 
legislative authorization for the taking is inadequate; judges need 
a constitutional rule to filter good from bad exercise of eminent 
domain.37 Their position is that economic redevelopment is not a 
public use per se, or, in the alternative, that courts should enquire 
closely whether the public benefits sought are reasonably certain 
to be accomplished. 
35. It is important to recall that Epstein's ethical objection to eminent domain ' 
stems from his broader objection to any form of wealth redistribution. RICHARD 
EpSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EMINENT DOMAIN, 162-66 (1985). A 
contending principle might be that measures that improve the public welfare ought 
not to be prohibited because they also redistribute wealth, if the basic rights of prior 
owner are respected. 
36. See www.ij.orglprivate_property/index.html (Last visited February 16, 2005). 
37. Some justifications for narrowly construing public use seem merely incanta-
tional. The South Carolina Supreme Court takes the view that even if a planned 
project has undeniable, significant economic benefits for a local government, emi-
nent domain cannot be used because "the use of the power of eminent domain for 
such purposes runs squarely into the right of an individual to own property and use 
it as he pleases." Georgia Dep't of Trans. v. Jasper County, South Carolina, 586 
S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.c. 2003), quoting Karesh v. City Council of City of Charleston, 247 
S.E. 2d 342, 345 (S.c. 1978). Of course, an owner has no right to as he pleases with 
his property, even in South Carolina, but is subject to a broad array of common law 
and public law restrictions in the public interest. In any event, such a right has little 
connection with the meaning of public use. Property rights proponents have not 
made a convincing positive normative case against expropriation per se. 
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But concern about eminent domain is not an exclusive posses-
sion of the right. Ralph Nader and Allen Hirsch have also ar-
gued for heightened scrutiny of public use whenever taken land 
is transferred to a private party.38 Nader fought for the 
Poletowners against General Motors and Detroit at the time of 
the condemnation. His argument here does give particular 
weight to the losses suffered by displaced residents, but the con-
stitutional solution offered by his co-author and him is to apply 
strict scrutiny to the public use justification for such takings.39 
But, as I have argued, the losses suffered are essentially unre-
lated to the purpose pursued or the ultimate owner of the prop-
erty taken. 
On the other hand, it seems undeniably true that in many in-
stances, the community will be better off, even after compensa-
tion is paid, if particular parcels are owned by A rather than B, 
particularly if A has the expertise and resources to combine them 
with other parcels to create a well-located site of an appropriate 
size for productive activity not otherwise feasible in that commu-
nity. B's concerns about receiving less compensation than he 
thinks fair goes only to the question of whether the compensa-
tion is constitutionally just. Further, to the extent that courts are 
being asked to weigh in some intrusive manner whether the pub-
lic benefits that a project will bring are large enough or of the 
right kind, they are being lured back to a Lochnerean inquiry 
into the wisdom of legislative measures. Indeed, such an ap-
proach bears a strong structural and ideological relation to an 
enhanced means-ends analysis in regulatory takings cases.40 
Moreover, no principled constitutional line can be drawn across 
such varying perceptions. This seems borne out by several recent 
cases. 
The cases where courts have expanded the requirements for 
"public use" do sometimes present troubling facts, but offer inad-
equate constitutional solutions.41 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lan-
38. Ralph Nader and Allen Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. 
L. REV. 207 (2004). They also filed a brief amicus curiae in Hathcock, urging the 
court to overturn Poletown. 
39. Id. at 224-25. 
40. The Supreme Court rejected such inquiries in Lingle v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 
125 S.Ct. 2074 (2005). 
41. Other significant recent cases include Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n, 306 F.3d 
445 (7th Cir. 2002)(lack of public use in attempted vuiding of a restrictive covenant 
to permit commercial use; less deference paid to determinations of public use by 
agencies without legislative power); Southwestern Illinois Development Auth. v. Nat. 
City Envtl., L.L.c., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002)(no public use in attempted taking for a 
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caster Redevelopment Agency,42 is an important case because 
here a federal court purporting to follow Midkiff found that a 
taking served a purely private interest because the public interest 
advanced was pre textual. In that case, it appears that a county 
redevelopment agency sought to condemn land so it could void a 
lease with the plaintiff, in order to allow Costco to expand its 
store onto that adjacent site. The "power center" in which these 
stores stood was the prize accomplishment of the county's rede-
velopment efforts and the only shopping center in town with a 
"regional draw." The court characterized this as the "naked 
transfer of property from one private party to another."43 The 
county argued that it needed Cost co to remain in the center as an 
anchor to preserve its economic value to the county. The court 
rejected this contention, because of a lack of evidence in the re-
cord suggesting that this was the real reason or was plausible.44 
This, of course, entirely departs from Midkiffs admonition to 
courts to accept a "conceivable" public purpose and not to con-
sider whether the taking would in fact achieve its purpose. 
But what actually was constitutionally infirm in what the 
county attempted to do? The preservation of the success of the 
power center obviously was an important goal for the county and 
losing its anchor store would have been perilous. Of course, the 
county may have been wrong, Costco could have been bluffing, 
but it is hard to see how a court would be a better judge of that 
than the city, which had no non-economic reason to prefer one 
retailer to another and intended to put a lot of public money be-
hind its judgment, by selling the land to Costco for $1. Given the 
serious public money being expended, one would also expect vot-
ers to evaluate critically the wisdom of such spending. 
parking lot for a raceway); Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)(no 
public use under state constitution in taking for mixed use development); Casino 
Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998)(taking of 
residences for future vague enhancement of Trump casino not a public use). See 
generally Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Hold-
ings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 Real Prop. Prob. and Trust J. 251 (2004). 
42. 99 Cents Only v. Lancaster, 237 F.Supp. 2d 1123 (CD. Cal. 2001). 
43. [d. at 1129. It seems fair to surmise that Costco's insistence on expanding onto 
the site of the plaintiff may have reflected a desire to get rid of the plaintiff, which 
would compete with Costco on many products, out of the center. Such desires are 
unexceptionable in themselves and non-competition clauses are commonly en-
shrined in shopping center leases. Moreover, 99 Cents probably fought the case 
because of the advantage of being contiguous to Costco. 
44. The discussion in the case is confusing because Lancaster sought to fit its ac-
count within the terms of preventing "future blight" in order arguably to place its 
action within the state enabling statute. 
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What about injury to the plaintiff? As a constitutional matter, 
it is hard to see why we should care. The city offered to buyout 
the plaintiff's lease for its market value plus additional amounts 
to cover moving expenses and lost goodwill, presumably some-
thing quite close to the damages that a landlord would suffer for 
(efficiently) breaching the lease. While 99 Cents Store was being 
"singled out" by the city in some sense, the criteria was straight-
forwardly economic. Surely, its corporate "feelings" do not 
pluck any constitutional strings!45 However much the efforts of 
Lancaster to maintain the value of the center may resemble mak-
ing sausages, nothing in the constitution should be seen to pre-
vent it.46 
Hathcock v. Wayne County,47 demands attention as the deci-
sion reversing Poletown. The case involved an attempt by Wayne 
County to assemble land for a business and technology park, im-
mediately south of the newly renovated airport, intended to stim-
ulate the depressed economy of the greater Detroit area. After 
buying nearly 1,000 acres consensually, the county sought to take 
by eminent domain the remaining 300 acres of the project area 
held in scattered lots by several owners. The takings were au-
thorized by a state statute requiring that they be "necessary" for 
the "use or benefit of the public." The Michigan Supreme Court. 
held the proposed takings unconstitutional, ruling that, in the ab-
sence of blight, government per se cannot take property and 
transfer it to a private owner regardless of the amount or cer-
tainty of the economic benefit to the public.48 
45. Business corporations simply lack the capacity to entwine their property with 
their "personhood." Margaret 1. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 
957 (1982). 
46. Professor Garnet suggests that 99 Cents Only Stores shows "the salutary role 
that a heightened means-ends [analysis]" could play. Nicole Stelle Garnet, supra, 
note 19 at 967. But the court breezily dismissed the city's plausible claim that ca-
tering to Costco was necessary to protect the center, a bet on which it was prepared 
to expend both money and political capital. The court's hasty rejection of the city's 
claims undermines Professor Garnet's belief that greater judicial involvement will 
enhance the public interest. 
The Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005), fin-
gered 99 Cents Only Store, as a case of "one to one transfer of property, executed 
outside of the confines of an integrated development plan" that ought to be viewed 
"with a skeptical eye." [d. at 2667, n. 17. That seems fair, but should not entail a 
reflexive conclusion that such condemnations cannot substantially further the public 
welfare. 
47. County of Wayne, 684 N.W.2d 765. 
48. I do not know how the court would apply this rule to leases of taken facilities 
by the government to private users, which can range from 99-years ground leases, as 
in Kelo, to short term \eases of small retail spaces. 
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The Hathcock opinion is depressingly formalistic and opaque, 
finding only (doubtfully) that the Michigan courts did not inter-
pret "public use" to include "benefit" at the time the current 
state constitution was adopted in 1963.49 Thus, there is little 
analysis of what values such a ruling serves and its costs. The 
property owners in the case were not neighbors in a thriving resi-
dential neighborhood, as in Poletown. Several owned merely va-
cant land held for speculation and thus were fully compensable 
by damages. At the same time, the decision burdens local gov-
ernments trying to generate economic activity in a state that last 
year ranked 48th in the creation of new jobs. There is no claim in 
the opinion that the project Wayne County was pursuing was 
other than a sensible, carefully considered, democratically ap-
proved attempt to create some economic synergy in the right 
place. 
The court did purport to consider three practical arguments 
other than economics to justify the takings. First, it rejected the 
idea that assemblage of the entire area under one owner was nec-
essary for the project, based upon its observation that "the land-
scape of our country is flecked with shopping centers, office 
parks, clusters of hotels, and centers of entertainment and com-
merce."50 This seems not to have been a problem of factual re-
cord, as such, but a sweeping conclusion that since controlling an 
entire area is not necessary for all economic development, it is 
never necessary - a conclusion infirm in logic. It is difficult to 
understand why the law should privilege the inexpert views of a 
court on the necessity of unified control in any particular case 
over the contrary view of the state (through its authorizing stat-
ute) or the county that is prepared to pay for the land. The real-
ity, of course, is that sometimes unified control over a site is 
necessary and sometimes it is not. 
Second, the court was troubled by a lack of continuing public 
oversight to ensure that the land taken would continue to serve 
public needs after being conveyed to private businesses. But the 
county wants to lure economic activity and cannot accomplish 
that goal if it sets too rigid rules for making profits or threatens 
49. The court seems not to have considered whether those who adopted the 1963 
constitution might have read "public use" in light of Berman, the mass of state cases 
following it, or the interpretation implicit in the Michigan legislation authorizing 
takings for public benefit. 
50. Id. at 783. 
HeinOnline -- 23 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 147 2005
2005] LOW INCOME RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITIES 147 
penalties for failure.51 In any event, the County did act pursuant 
to a plan that a developer would need to follow. Oversight is 
always a question of degree. 
Lastly, the court noted that its ruling does not invalidate the 
clearing of blighted slums as a public purpose. Ironically, this 
ruling insures that very poor people can continue to be displaced 
from their communities for redevelopment by private develop-
ers. The court's justification for this is only that they had ap-
proved such takings for urban renewal before the 1963 
constitution was adopted. The opinion as a whole is wooden and 
obtuse about both constitutional law and urban realities. 
Finally, Kelo v. City of New London,52 has taken on great sig-
nificance since a divided Supreme Court affirmed a decision ad-
hering to established law deferring to legislative determinations 
of "public use." A divided Connecticut Supreme Court en bane 
upheld New London's taking of several homes and two busi-
nesses as part of a redevelopment of a waterside site to enhance 
its economic potential for the benefit of the entire city. The 
court employed a Berman type analysis, concluding that federal 
and Connecticut interpretations of "public use" were identical. 
The court plainly was impressed by the care in the planning that 
went into the decision to develop this sort of mixed use and ma-
rina project adjacent to a new Pfizer "global research center." 
The court canvassed the recent decisions taking a harder line 
against eminent domain for economic redevelopment, but con-
cluded that each dealt with "outlier" facts and did not change the 
traditional manner of review. 
Justice Zarella's dissenting opinion may be the most careful 
opinion yet justifying greater judicial activism in eminent do-
main.53 After agreeing that a court should defer to a legislature'S 
statement that its announced purpose would constitute a public 
use, he stated that a court should go on to examine what the 
"actual use" of the property would be and require the city to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that proposed public 
51. This is a difficult matter that deserves more extended consideration: what 
should government constitutionally be required to do to increase the chances that 
taken land will be used for purposes that advance the public welfare. State authoriz-
ing statutes sometimes specify such matters. 
52. Keto, 125 S.Ct. 2655. 
53. He would have been better off omitting a largely mythic history of property 
rights and eminent domain. It is a gross simplification to claim that "protection of 
private property is the principal aim of our society." Id. at 577. Also he places the 
adoption of the first takings clauses after concern about overuse for canals, etc. 
HeinOnline -- 23 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 148 2005
148 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 23:131 
benefits would in fact be realized.54 The dissent felt that the 
greater uncertainty of securing public benefit from economic re-
development than from traditional public projects justified the 
courts in applying a "heightened standard of judicial review ... 
to ensure that the constitutional rights of private property are 
protected adequately .... "55 
Although Justice Zarella should be commended for actually 
trying to articulate the real issues here, his analysis is faulty. He 
found two distinctions between takings for economic develop-
ment and "traditional takings." First, he argued that "traditional 
takings almost always are followed by an immediate or reasona-
bly foreseeable public benefit."56 He seems confused here, as his 
. examples show. The destruction of slum housing might indeed 
be soon followed by "relocation of project area residents and 
demolition of substandard structures," but a net public benefit 
may never come from what can also be viewed as a tragedy. Can 
we say that there is a public benefit if the displacees dwell in 
worse housing and the land lies unused? A dam can be an envi-
ronmental disaster and a military base a jumping off point for 
tragedy. In short, the dissent confuses immediately putting con-
demned property to a public use, which is largely a matter of 
definition, with immediately securing a public benefit, which is 
always less certain. 
Second, Justice Zarella argues that the public benefit that 
comes from a "conventional taking typically flows from the ac-
tions of the taking party" rather than a private transferee. This is 
demonstrably wrong in the cases of condemnation for railroad 
lines, canals, and mills, which are privately built and run. But it 
may also be wrong in cases of facilities that continue to be owned 
by the government. Nearly all will be occupied and used by gov-
ernment officials different from those who authorized the expro-
priation. Some require that they be used by private persons to 
create public benefit, such as roads or port facilities. Even tak-
ings that create purely public facilities managed by the govern-
ment may never create any public benefit. The general point is 
that securing future benefits from any activity of government re-
quires complex and uncertain predictions about the future be-
havior of many public and private persons. Requiring certainty 
prevents action. 
54. Id. at 583. 
55. Id. at 587. 
56. Id. at 578. 
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The dissent also claims that takings for redevelopment raise a 
peculiar problem of government acting to aid powerful private 
interests. Many commentators have identified such "rent seek-
ing" as the root problem with redevelopment takingsY No 
doubt this problem is real; Professor Merrill carefully explains 
the advantages to a private interest in getting the government to 
use eminent domain on its behalf rather than securing the prop-
erty through a consensual dea1.58 What seems missing from these 
concerns is comparison with some acceptable baseline of realistic 
governmental action. Is the threat of undue private influence 
greater in eminent domain than in land use regulation or eco-
nomic subsidy? After all, in this case, New London was going to 
lease the land to be taken to a developer for $1 per year, not an 
uncommon arrangement to promote the economic objectives of 
the project, yet a far greater benefit to that developer than using 
eminent domain to acquire it in the first place.59 Similarly, New 
London was going to rezone the area, greatly enhancing its value 
to the developer. As we know, a city can rezone land bringing 
serious loss to the present owner who generally is not entitled to 
any compensation. If fact, nearly all legislation has substantial 
distributional consequences, and private interests maintain ar-
mies of lobbyists to try to capture benefits and fend off costs. 
There seems no reason to suppose that eminent domain presents 
risks of a different type or magnitude than any legislation, nearly 
all of which appropriately get low levels of judicial scrutiny. 
Moreover, nearly every government project using eminent do-
main, even entirely traditional public uses, like building a mili-
tary base, can have significant distributional consequences that 
private interests will contend over. 
What does raise special concern in Kelo is that relatively low 
income people will be displaced from their homes. This fact is 
featured prominently in news accounts of the case and in the pe-
tition for certiorari.60 Yet it plays no role in Justice Zarella's dis-
57. Id. at 579. 
58. See Merrill, supra, note 25. 
59. Similarly, in 99 Cents Only Stores, Lancaster was going to pay $3.4 million for 
the land and another $150,000 plus to break the plaintiffs lease, and then sell the 
land to Costco for $1. 99 Cents Only v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 
F.Supp.2d 1123, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
60. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Conn., at 2, Kelo v. 
City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, (No. 04-108) ("Petitioners have poured their 
labor and love into their homes. They are places where people have lived for years, 
have raised their families, and have grown old."). 
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sent, or in any of the opinions tightening the vice on public use. 
Moreover, Zarella and the Hatchcock opinion go out of their way 
to reaffirm the blight cases. Thus, the campaign against eminent 
domain has the curious disjuncture that the remedies offered 
provide at best tangential benefits to the most conspicuous and 
sympathetic victims of the measures. Rather, the decisions and 
the arguments seem to serve highly abstract judgments about the 
symbolic value of secure property rights that cannot survive criti-
cal scrutiny. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinions in Kelo raise too many in-
teresting issues to be dealt with in an afterthought. Although the 
Court squarely rejected petitioner's argument that economic de-
velopment cannot be a public use, the Court did not expansively 
equate public use with the police power but essentially scruti-
nized the record for indicia that the project reasonably could be 
thought to have a substantial public benefit.6l Justice 
O'Connor's dissent embraces the petitioner's argument, and thus 
labors to distinguish Berman and Midkiff as involving only the 
elimination of harmful land uses, and caricatures the Court's 
opinion as holding that government can take from A and give to 
B so long as the use is "upgraded".62 While she may rightfully be 
concerned about the propriety of some redevelopment projects, 
she does not thoughtfully examine whether they may better be 
checked by judicial limitations on the ostensible purposes for em-
inent domain than by process-based protections. The visceral, in-
deed, paranoid public reaction to Kelo, fomented to an extent by 
O'Connor's intemperate rhetoric, has substituted for a season 
the shouting of simplistic slogans and frenetic lobbying for schol-
arly weighing of ends and means. 
III. 
REDEVELOPMENT TAKINGS AND THE URBAN POOR 
In preceding sections, I have tried to frame more precisely con-
cerns about the harms caused by eminent domain. My conten-
tion has been that there should be no serious constitutional 
objection to using eminent domain for economic redevelopment, 
even if the taken property ends up in the control of private devel-
opers. The arguments of property rights advocates and support-
ive judges seriously miss the mark. But one must confront 
61. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2666-67. 
62. Id. at 2671, 2673-74. 
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directly the special harm of displacement from one's home, 
which sever residents from places and communities bound up 
with their identities and social possibilities. As developed below, 
these harms may be visited more drastically on the poor, and cur-
rent constitutional law gives them less protection. 
While the Takings Clause requires just compen~ation for the 
property taking, it steadfastly has ignored the more complex 
losses imposed by residential displacement. As explained more 
fully below, condemnees generally receive only the fair market 
value of the property taken, but no damages for consequences of 
displacement, including moving expenses, the likely higher cost 
of replacement housing, and personal losses. Poor residents 
often own little property of value, but suffer disproportionately 
from a forced move. This imbalance poses two problems for the 
poor. First, it encourages government to choose too readily the 
places where low income people live as the location for new 
projects that can be accomplished through eminent domain, be-
cause taking those places is less costly. Second, low income re-
sidents must bear a higher percentage of their losses. In this 
section, I offer interpretations of the Takings Clause that may 
ameliorate these concerns. 
But concern about unfairness of constitutional compensation 
to poor residents does not lead directly to the conclusion that the 
poor should oppose the use of eminent domain for urban eco-
nomic redevelopment. Urban governments most likely to pursue 
redevelopment are also the most consistent champions of poor 
residents, who continue disproportionately to live in cities. In-
creases in employment and tax base sought through such rede-
velopment often rebound to the benefit of the poor, since they 
are most dependent on the capacity of urban government to pro-
vide services and benefits and will benefit disproportionately 
from locating new economic activity in cities. Thus changes in 
the approach to eminent domain must hold in tension sometimes 
conflicting concerns lest they make poor residents worse off than 
before. It may help to clarify this point before turning to reme-
dies for the distortions in just compensation law. 
A. The Stake of the Poor in Urban Redevelopment 
Poor people and racial minorities long have borne a dispropor-
tionate share of the burden of expropriation for urban redevel-
opment. The urban renewal programs that formed the core of 
national urban policy from 1945 to the 1970's often was charac-
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terized aptly as "Negro removal," as they often purposefully re-
placed low income black communities with higher income, 
largely white residential developments.63 In Kelo, the NAACP, 
joined by the AARP and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Council, argued that using eminent domain for economic rede-
velopment "will disproportionately harm racial and ethnic mi-
norities, the elderly, and the economically underprivileged."64 
The nub of the argument was that since low value property was 
being put to higher value uses, poor people would be dispos-
sessed more often.6s This view seems simplistic. 
It makes sense that a city trying to enhance the economic value 
of its fabric would eliminate the dwellings to which its poorest 
residents have been relegated. These are low~st market value 
developments, and, characterized as "blight," their removal in it-
self long has been considered an acceptable goal for a taking, 
regardless of what replaced them.66 And it also seems predict-
able that, everything else being equal, expropriation would fall 
upon those with the least power in the local political process. 
During the heyday of urban renewal in the 1950's and 60's, poor 
minorities lacked political power, even in cities where their num-
bers might have justified it, and this exposed them to remova1.67 
But permitting eminent domain to remove blight but not more 
broadly to permit economic redevelopment, as was assumed at 
that time, ensures that property taken for redevelopment will dis-
63. Between 1949 and 1963, 63% of all families displaced by urban renewal were 
non-white and 56% of the non-white families were poor enough to be eligible for 
public housing (although usually none was available). BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & 
LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES, 28 (MIT 
Press 1989). In Baltimore, for example, urban renewal and highway project demoli-
tion displaced 10,000 families, 90% of whom were black. Supra, note 60 at 29. 
64. Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP, et al. at 3, Kelo v. City of New London, 843 
A.2d 500, (No. 04-108). The brief discloses no embarrassment from the fact that the 
property owners in the case do not fall within these categories. 
65. Id. at 3-4. Bizarrely, the brief does not quarrel with Berman or the many 
blight cases in which nearly all those displaced were black and poor. See id. at 16-18. 
66. New York City Housing Authority, supra, note 17. Designations of blight or 
slum conditions by redevelopment agencies have been treated as conclusive by 
courts. Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E. 2d 659 (1953). In the period before serious 
relaxing of "public use," developers would look for the "blight that's right," an area 
with development potential that could be characterized with a straight face as blight, 
often gerrymandering the boundaries of a project to include some substandard resi-
dential buildings. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra, note 63, at 23. Findings that a pro-
ject would clear away blight or slums also helped unlock the coffers of federal urban 
renewal funds. 42 V.S.C 1441. 
67. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and 
the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 1, 51 (2003). 
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place the poorest residents. Today, it seems probable that any 
exercise of eminent domain that disproportionately harmed 
members of a racial minority would violate the federal Fair 
Housing ACt.68 
Nonetheless, since low income people continue to reside dis-
proportionately in cities, their future prospects are linked with 
those of the nation's cities. They should want their cities to exer-
cise eminent domain if it can accomplish overall economic stimu-
lation. The social and economic prospects for urban low income 
residents necessarily depend on the ability of cities to maintain 
their economies both for employment opportunities and for the 
revenue capacity of the city to provide education, housing, and 
other services needed to advance.69 During the 20th century, the 
economic prospects for cities deteriorated dramatically. Early in 
the century, dependence in manufacturing on fixed place rail and 
harbor transportation concentrated industry and immigration in 
city centers. The rise of trucking on modern highways, along 
with improvements in electrical transmission destroyed the com-
petitive advantage enjoyed by cities in manufacturing, even as 
southern blacks streamed into northern cities in search of disap-
pearing jobs.70 Federal aid and urban renewal were early efforts 
to address this fundamental economic problem.71 But federal aid 
to cities has declined precipitously, placing most of the burden of 
providing services on state and local governments.72 
Cities have in fact become successful promoters of real estate 
development within their borders, and in the process have 
clawed their ways back from the precipices of insolvency that 
threatened many older cities not many years ago. They have 
done this through shrewd redevelopment and public subsidies 
68. 42 U.S.c. 3601 et seq. Section 3604(a) makes it "unlawful ... [t]o make un-
available or deny ... a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, ... or 
national origin." Most courts hold that violations of the FHA can be made out by 
showing that the challenged acts have a discriminatory effect on protected persons. 
See, e.g., Metro. Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 
(7th Cir. 1977), Cert. Denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). The NAACP would far better 
use its resources in developing this theory than in embracing libertarian property 
arguments. 
69. J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 How. L. J. 405 (2003). 
70. See generally, DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY: URBANISM AND ITS END (Yale Uni-
versity Press 2003); FRED SIEGAL, THE FUTURE ONCE HAPPENED HERE: NEW 
YORK, D.C., L.A. AND THE FATE OF AMERICA'S BIG CITIES (Free Press 1997). 
71. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE ROUGH ROAD TO RENAISSANCE; URBAN REVI. 
TALIZATION IN AMERICA, 1940-1985 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1990). 
72. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Bush Budget Would Cut Millions From City's Social Ser-
vices, N.Y.Times, Feb. 9, 2005, at B3. 
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that have attracted substantial private investment. Redevelop-
ments of waterfronts, no longer suitable for containerized ship-
ping, into residential and recreational centers, for example, have 
brought tourists, new residents and businesses downtown. Of 
course, not all such efforts have been successful, but enough have 
been to provide a new model of urban redevelopment. 
Some of these efforts have displaced existing residents. But it 
is naYve to suggest that urban communities are stable in the ab-
sence of redevelopment. Far more people, of course, have left 
older cities due to industrial disinvestment and the large array of 
public and private inducements to move to suburbs than have 
been displaced by redevelopment. 73 American cities in the 
1960's and 1970's witnessed flight from central sites and urban 
decay that have no precedent outside of war.74 Urban economic 
projects attempt to provide greater economic stability to declin-
ing places by bringing employment and new residents to where 
people already are.75 Even the Pole town project, however mis-
guided, was an attempt to provide stability to Detroit at the sacri-
fice of a neighborhood; to give more people a reason to stay. It is 
understandable but far too limited to consider the plight of those 
forced to leave by condemnation without consideration of those 
forced to leave by disappearing jobs, community, and hope. 
The cities also have created structures that give greater voice 
and more tangible benefits to low income residents. Substantial 
grass roots protests emerged in reaction to urban renewal and 
highway construction, eventually halting large top-down redevel-
opment. Cities found that they could undertake large projects 
only with the informed consent of affected citizens and eventu-
ally allowed neighborhood voices a place at the bargaining table. 
73. The population of Cleveland, for example, declined from 915,000 in 1950 to 
478,000 in 2000, a striking decrease but not untypical for northern industrial cities. 
New London, Connecticut, had lost 10% of its population and thousands of jobs in 
the 1990's, compared to the 115 parcels of land taken in the project challenged in 
Keto, 125 S.Ct. 2655. 
74. The most notorious example is New York City's South Bronx, where crime 
and drugs led to a wave of arson the effects of which have been compared to those 
from the bombing of German cities in World War II. TEAFORD, supra, note 71, 206-
07. See generally JILL JONNES, SOUTH BRONX RISING: THE RISE, FALL, AND RESUR· 
RECTION OF AN AMERICAN CITY (Fordham University Press 2002). 
75. For a large scale defense of adopting policies to support community economic 
stability, see THAD WILLIAMSON, DAVID IMBROSCIO, AND GAR ALPEROVITZ, MAK· 
ING A PLACE FOR COMMUNITY: LOCAL DEMOCRACY IN THE GLOBAL ERA (Rout-
ledge 2002). 
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One respected study concluded: "Public-private deal making was 
critical for the rebuilding of downtown."76 
Cities have greater need for exercising eminent domain than 
suburbs or rural areas because they are least likely to have large 
tracts of vacant or undeveloped land available for new ventures. 
They need more often to assemble large sites from smaller, previ-
ously developed parcels. Urban land assembly costs will be 
higher. Government can overcome these handicaps by using em-
inent domain to assemble substantially-sized tracts at strategic lo-
cations. Familiar examples that most would consider successful 
are the Inner Harbor in Baltimore and Times Square in New 
York. Making eminent domain for economic redevelopment un-
constitutional would strike at the heart of a process that has con-
tributed to urban regeneration since the 1970's. 
Poor city dwellers would benefit most from more jobs within 
or near the city. We continue to suffer from a striking imbalance 
between job creation on suburban fringes and persistent unem-
ployment and poverty within urban cores and older, inner ring 
suburbs, particularly among African-Americans.77 Moreover, at-
tracting higher income residents to urban areas would break 
down some of the isolation which exacerbates the social depriva-
tion of the underclass. For example, the educational accomplish-
ments of poor inner city children may improve when they mix 
with children from more affluent homes that hold higher expec-
tations for schools. Higher tax revenues permit greater expendi-
tures on education and other supportive social services. To the 
extent that the plight of poor citizens has been aggravated by the 
flight of the middle class and employment to the suburbs, its re-
turn to the city can aid them.78 
Sometimes, poor urban residents are the direct beneficiaries of 
redevelopment expropriations. For example, the Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative formed a community development cor-
poration in Boston that condemned thirty acres of privately 
owned land for a much admired, community controlled, mixed 
use development of affordable housing and local businesses.79 
76. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra, note 63, at 316. 
77. See, e.g., Michael A. Stoll, "Job Sprawl and the Spatial Mismatch Between 
Jobs and Blacks," February 2005, available at http://www.brookings.orglindexlre-
ports.htm. 
78. I develop this theme in the context of gentrification in Byrne, Two Cheers for 
Gentrification, supra, note 69. 
79. Elizabeth A. Taylor, The Dudley Street Initiative and the Power of Eminent 
Domain, 36 B.c. L. REV. 1061 (1995). 
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The project could not have achieved its goals without land assem-
bly through eminent domain.80 In truth, benefits to low income 
people from redevelopment usually is more indirect, from an im-
proved economy, but political organization can help poor re-
sidents get direct, but collateral benefits, such as set asides of 
affordable housing units.81 Below, I address procedural reforms 
that could give condemnees greater voice in redevelopment 
projects. 
It is unclear the extent to which property rights advocates view 
use of eminent domain, to develop low income housing by com-
munity development corporations, to raise less concern about 
public use than development of market rate housing or commer-
cial space by profit seeking firms. It certainly could be argued 
that the benefit to the public from subsidized housing is direct 
while the benefit from market rate housing comes indirectly from 
economic stimulus. But subsidized housing likely will be built 
and managed by community development corporations or their 
even more private agents, so the government would need to look 
to private actors to achieve public ends. Experience has shown 
that private parties, including non-profits and community devel-
opment corporations, do a better job of creating and producing 
subsidized housing than do public housing authorities. It would 
be perverse for constitutional rulings to drive innovative housing 
and development programs back to comparatively inefficient 
government ownership. 
Anecdotes and conjecture are an inadequate basis upon which 
to assess the benefits and failures of redevelopment. There is an 
urgent need for empirical studies to understand better the role 
played by eminent domain in overcoming holdouts in the reinvig-
oration of depressed communities, accomplishing smart growth, 
and redeveloping brownfields. Unfortunately, judicial decisions 
and public debate seem to be proceeding largely on the basis of 
lively anecdotes rendered by partisans. 
Before leaving the, topic of harms and benefits to the poor 
from redevelopment, I need to touch upon another conceptual 
80. [d. at 1080. 
8l. An example of this is the Arthur Capper/Carrollsburg project in Washington, 
DC. This is a Hope VI project replacing older public housing (rather than an exer-
cise of eminent domain), but residents were able to obtain a firm commitment to 
replacing each public housing unit in the new development one for one, even as the 
city develops another 525 subsidized units and 300 market rate units. See District of 
Columbia Housing Authority, Arthur Capper/Carrollsburg, available at http://www. 
dchousing.orglhope6/arthuccapper_hope6.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2005.). 
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issue. Urban living is even more intensely contextual than rural 
or suburban living. People live in denser housing that is discon-
nected from natural geographical elements. The value of private 
space depends even more on location; the character of any loca-
tion depends on numerous municipal services and cooperation 
on so many different levels that clear distinctions between public 
and private spheres seem forced. People spend more time in 
public space and the enhancement of its amenity value is more 
acute. Thus the balance between public and private rights in cit-
ies has tilted more toward the public throughout history. Cities 
have been more prone to regulate housing standards and land 
use, and employ eminent domain, than rural areas. Accordingly, 
property owners have less reasonable expectations of being free 
from civic action. As we consider below, however, this also mag-
nifies the loss they suffer when displaced from their communities. 
B. Procedural Rights for Residents 
Even if poor residents as a group ought to support urban rede-
velopment programs, they also still are most likely to be dis-
placed by them, as discussed above. In other words, poor 
residents want successful programs but are concerned about 
where they occur. Post urban renewal redevelopment projects 
generally attempt to avoid large displacements and involve re-
sidents and grass roots representatives more fully in the negotia-
tion process.82 In an ideal world, one might mandate that poor 
residents ought not to be more likely than all residents to be dis-
placed and would be guaranteed a fair share of the benefits from 
any redevelopment program. But the economic reality is that 
poor residents are likely to be concentrated in low value enclaves 
that repel private investment. Moreover, private capital can be 
induced to take on the risks of investment in such locations only 
on the prospect of substantial returns. 
If a central problem for poor residents is a lack of political 
power, it may be possible to construe the Takings Clause to man-
date procedures that can amplify their political voices. Impor-
tant statutes have required decision makers to weigh more 
carefully the various costs of demolition. The National Environ-
82. A recent study found a consensus among local officials that large scale urban 
development projects "should proceed only if their negative side effects were negli-
gible, or at least fully mitigated." ALAN ALTSHULER AND DAVID LUBEROFF, MEGA-
PROJEcrs: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF URBAN PuBLIC INVESTMENT 43 (Brookings 
Institution Press 2003). 
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mental Policy Act requires consideration of the environmental 
impacts of a project and of alternatives before a federal project is 
begun.83 The National Historic Preservation Act requires an 
agency to consider adverse effects on historic resources, includ-
ing neighborhoods eligible for inclusion in the National Register 
of Historic Places, before undertaking a project,84 and Section 
4(f) of the Transportation Act requires highway officials to take 
numerous steps to avoid or minimize harming various lands, such 
as wildlife refuges, public parks, and historic resources.85 
Such statutes will affirmatively protect some neighborhoods 
against thoughtless destruction, by directing attention to environ-
mental or historical resources.86 Even more, they provide mod-
els for collecting information and considering more carefully the 
costs of eliminating functioning communities. For example, EPA 
already expressly considers disproportionate effects on poor and 
minority communities in assessing the environmental effects of 
projects that it undertakes that are subject to NEPA.87 Such stat-
utory procedures also provide opportunities for voice by the ex-
isting residents to explain the value of current communities. The 
legal and political mobilization of residents facilitated by such 
statutory procedures effectively changed the power balance in 
transportation planning and construction, ending the urban high-
way construction craze of the 1950's and 60'S.88 Residents of 
83. 42 U.S.c. 4321 et seq. Numerous states have adopted similar provisions for 
actions by state and local governments. For example the California Environmental 
Quality Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code sec 21000 et seq, requires early consideration of 
environmental consequences of using a site planned for condemnation for some 
public use. Failure to conduct prior environmental analysis can lead to dismissal of 
an eminent domain action. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth v. Hensler, 
233 Cal.App.3d 577 (1991). 
84. 16 U.S.C. 461 et seq. 
85. 49 U.S.c. 303. 
86. Interestingly, an Environmental Impact Statement was prepared and chal-
lenged as insufficient in federal court concerning the Pole town project. Crosby v. 
Young, 512 F.Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981). The court rejected the plaintiffs' con-
tention that the EIS failed to consider reasonable alternate sites for the GM plant, 
because it held that the proposed alternates were not feasible. Id. at 1379. How-
ever, the inquiry never engaged with the costs of displacement, except to note that 
some alternates were rejected because they would displace more people. What 
should be required in the future is a public inquiry into whether the benefits of the 
project exceed the costs of displacement, so the political process will explicitly ad-
dress it. 
87. See Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in 
EPA's NEPA Compliance Analysis (Apr. 1998), available at www.epa.gov/compli-
ance/resources/policies/ej/ej~uidance_nepa_epa0498.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 
2005). 
88. ALTSHULER & LUBEROFF, supra, note 82, at 88. 
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Washington, for example, used procedural rights under the 
Transportation Act to stall and eventually defeat construction of 
highways through black neighborhoods in the 1970's.89 
Drawing by analogy from these statutes, government could be 
forced to consider the costs of taking residents' homes, the rela-
tive value of alternate locations for a proposed project, and 
means of limiting the harm at the preferred site. As in NEPA 
and the NHPA, the emphasis should be on requiring study and 
disseminating information. This will have the advantage of invig-
orating political debate. The condemning authority might be re-
quired to find that the taking was "necessary" despite its 
awareness of the costs to the residents and its attempts to miti-
gate harm. While a court could assess the adequacy of the in-
quiry, the decision made should not be subject to review in 
substance, because the final decision whether to take property 
should be legislative. Such a process may also direct the atten-
tion of decision-makers to the value of functioning communities, 
even if poor; the blindness to these social assets was one of the 
greatest failings of urban renewal, as pointed out by Jane 
Jacobs.90 
The provision of federal money to cover the costs of acquisi-
tion and demolition may make even more critical the need for 
procedures that expose the costs of displacement. Local leaders 
are more likely to disregard the socioeconomic costs of displace-
ment when the federal government provides the bulk of funding. 
Professor William Fischel analyzes in a forthcoming paper how 
availability of federal dollars may distort the local political pro-
cess in favor of eminent domain, since federal programs typically 
grant funds only for specific types of projects. Fischel is con-
cerned that local officials might never consider alternate use of 
funds for redevelopment that would not have such large social 
costs. On a more specific level, another author has pointedly 
criticized the federal Community Development Block Grant pro-
89. See D.C. Federation of Civic Assoc'n v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir 1971), . 
cert. denied 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); Zachary M. Schrag, The Freeway Fight in Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Three Sisters Bridge in Three Administrations, 30 J. URB. HIST. 
648 (2004). 
90. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, 441 (Ran-
dom House 1961). 
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gram for not requiring a community or the HUD to detail the 
expected socioeconomic costs of displacement.91 
Process adequate to avoid systematic unfairness should be con-
stitutionally required as a procedural element of "public use," 
before any condemnation of existing residences. Even if Berman 
correctly abandoned any substantive restraint on eminent do-
main, it stumbled on a facile trust in an idealized political pro-
cess. Although the opinion trumpets the need to leave 
redevelopment decisions to the legislative process, the disen-
franchised residents of Washington, DC, had no voice at all in 
Congress's approval of urban renewal, let alone the subsequent 
administrative decisions about where and how it should be con-
ducted.92 Although DC is an extreme case, urban renewal was 
characterized by top down, technocratic decisions about the 
scope and location of expropriation that employed federal 
money to break free from customary local political constraints.93 
While interpretations of public use have most often been sub-
stantive, there is persuasive support for interpreting those words 
to create procedural protections. Matthew Harrison's historical 
analysis, discussed above, finds that the framers accepted emi-
nent domain when the product of "legislative consent" rather 
than of executive imposition. They also rejected British notions 
of "virtual representation" in a distant Parliament where they 
elected no members. This original concern with eminent domain 
as the fruit of consent through actual representation supports in-
terpretations ensuring vulnerable people a reasonable chance to 
be heard in the decision where to expropriate. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with that of Dean Treanor in his magisterial 
analysis of the original meaning of the Takings Clause, where he 
found that the framers mandated compensation in the case of 
physical appropriations because of concern that legislatures 
would undervalue the losses owners might suffer.94 He goes on 
91. Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an Economic Development TooL' A 
Proposal to Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 901, 
906. 
92. Residents of Washington have no voting representative in either house of 
Congress, which directly governed until elected local government was established in 
1974. The attempts of black residents to prevent the redevelopment of Southwest 
Washington, which was 76% black, are recounted in HOWARD GILLETTE, JR., BE-
TWEEN JUSTICE AND BEAUTY; RACE, PLANNING, AND THE FAILURE OF URBAN POL-
ICY IN WASHINGTON, D.C., 151-69 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1995). 
93. See, e.g., Douglas W. Rae, supra, note 70, at 320-25. 
94. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 855 (1995). 
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to suggest that an appropriate modern "translation" of this origi-
nal meaning would focus judicial scrutiny on "governmental ac-
tions that affect discrete and insular minorities in environmental 
justice cases. "95 
Moreover, scholarship about public use has emphasized con-
cern with rent seeking and other failures of the political process, 
typically diagnosed through the lens of public choice theory. 
Professor Garnet in her carefully reasoned recent article argues 
generally for some heightened scrutiny for the fit between the 
use of eminent domain and the purposes government claims to 
be seeking, but directs her programmatic suggestions toward pro-
cedural protections that will enhance the ability of courts to per-
form this analysis.96 While I disagree with her substantive 
analysis for the reasons given above, her arguments for greater 
procedural protection demonstrate the procedural core of the 
public use requirement. The Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard, for 
example, created both substantive and procedural barriers to 
regulators exacting property interests as mitigation before per-
mits would be issued; the city was forced to hold an individual-
ized inquiry, in which it bore the burden of proof, to establish 
"rough proportionality" between the harms addressed by the 
permit process and what the owner must convey.97 
Professor Garnet raises concern about "quick take" statutes, 
which permit the government to use streamlined procedures for 
eminent domain when circumstances require urgent public ac-
tion. She effectively notes that such statutes diminish the ability 
of residents to mobilize and argue against the taking of their 
homes before crucial decisions are made, and in Poletown the 
city did use quick take to ensure that its plan was "a fait accompli 
before meaningful opposition could be registered or informed 
opposition organized."98 Indeed, it is difficult to understand why 
such provisions should ever be available to displace residents 
from their homes, at least without a showing of the gravest exi-
gency, given the permanent scar of destruction of home and com-
munity. It is true that the Supreme Court long has held that 
"where adequate provision is made for the certain payment of 
95. [d. at 876. 
96. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934 at 969-74. 
97. Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 and n. 8 (1994). 
98. Garnett, supra, note 96 at 971, quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 
N.W.2d at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
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the compensation without unreasonable delay the taking does 
not contravene due process of law in the sense of the Fourteenth 
Amendment merely because it precedes the ascertainment of 
what compensation is juSt."99 Nonetheless, if one accepts that 
payment of money cannot make residents whole for the loss of 
their homes and communities, the argument for substantial ad-
vanced notice and a hearing on the need to take a particular loca-
tion seems compelling. After all, the relevant due process 
inquiry is whether a post deprivation hearing adequately protects 
cognizable in terests. lOO 
C. Reassessing Compensation for Residents 
Rather than insist on a substantive interpretation of the public 
use requirement, it may be more efficacious to address the crite-
ria for "just compensation." If public use is interpreted not to 
place substantive requirements in front of legislatures, then own-
ers no longer are protected in any sense by a "property" rule 
within the meaning of Guido Calabresi's famous taxonomy.1°1 If 
a court finds that the public use criterion has been met, or evis-
cerates the requirement entirely, then the residents' assets are 
protected only by a liability rule, offering damages for invasion 
of the owners' rights. Setting the measure of damages at differ-
ent levels will change the level of protection afforded the owner . 
and make the decision whether to take the property more or less 
efficient. It may also affect our judgment of whether the taking is 
just. 
The traditional measure of "just compensation," however, 
does not provide complete damages to residents. It is familiar 
that the standard of "just compensation" is met by the payment 
of "market value." That is, in most cases, the government need 
only pay for the taken property what a willing seller would have 
taken from a willing buyer in the absence of eminent domain. 
The problem is that the government's resort to eminent domain 
99. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 62 (1919); see also Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. 
Railway Co., 135 U.S. 641, 658-59 (1890). 
100. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
101. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). That is, if a 
Court decides that a proposed taking is not for a "public use," the government can-
not force the owner to surrender ownership, but can gain a transfer only on a con-
sensual basis. The distinction between property and liability rules is applied to 
several related problems in Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Emi-
nent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1978). 
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indicates that the seller is not willing. Most condemnees receive 
less than their actual loss, since they are not willing to sell at the 
prevailing market price (like most property owners at any given 
time). In some cases this may be attributable to negotiation 
strategy or a simple belief by the owner that he can manipulate 
the valuation litigation to get a higher price. But it also can be 
attributed to what Professor Merrill has called a "subjective pre-
mium," a personal value that the owner places upon his property 
well above its market value.102 In most cases, courts refuse to 
order any payment of such subjective losses. The consequence of 
this is that while in some cases there may be very little subjective 
loss, as in the case of unimproved land held for investment, in 
others there may be enormous subjective loss, as when a poor 
resident is driven from a community that is bulldozed. 
There are many reasons why market value may not be just 
compensation for residents. A home is both a haven from the 
assaults of society and a locus where the webs of family and com-
munity grasp us. One need not be a Hegelian to appreciate that 
personal identity can be significantly bound up in a home, espe-
cially one of long standing, which may be associated in memory 
with departed loved ones or stirring personal events.103 But in 
some cases, like Poletown, far more than an individual home is 
destroyed, namely an entire community and way of life centered 
on networked residences and community centers such as 
churches and shops. Thus, the loss to the individual is com-
pounded, and may increase geometrically (rather than arithmeti-
cally) by the size and vitality of the community destroyed. The 
individual loses relationships and the social meaning that comes 
from a familiar place and community, which may amount to 
"root shock. "104 There may even be ways in which these local 
community efforts and networks might be considered to be 
property.105 
102. Merrill, supra, note 25, at 83-84. 
103. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 
991-96 (1982). 
104. MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: How TEARING Up CITY 
NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (One 
World Ballantine Books 2004). In this recent book, an African-American psychia-
trist attempts to describe and gauge the harm caused an individual from being up-
rooted from a community. The effect of the destruction of black neighborhoods on 
former residents is at the core of her concern. 
105. See Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local Public Goods: Toward a Bet-
ter Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1 ( 2004). 
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Also, the poorer a displaced resident, the less likely it is that 
she will receive full compensation for her loss. First, to the ex-
tent a poor person owns a fee simple, it is likely to be of rela-
tively low market value, increasing the need to cope with a 
higher replacement cost. (Some slum property owners will wel-
come eminent domain as release from a hazardous investment.) 
Second, most poor people will not own a fee but have, at best, a 
leasehold: The government pays the value of the fee interests 
that it takes, and the parties divide the compensation according 
to their shares or lease provisions.106 But the amount realized by 
a low income residential tenant will be low in any event, and 
likely will be zero. There are several reasons for this: the value 
of the leasehold must be offset by rent to be paid.107 If a tenant 
holds on a month to month lease, no compensation will be due, 
even if local law permits eviction only for cause.108 Also, if the 
lease contains a standard "condemnation clause," which termi-
nates the lease upon the taking, no compensation need be 
paid.109 Thus, the tenant suffers the inconvenience and collateral 
harms of displacement, while the landlord, who may be a non-
resident investor, receives the full measure of his property's 
worth in the market. Third, for poor people, the value of social 
relations within the community may be a proportionately more 
valuable asset in their social portfolio than their financial invest-
ment in their residence; thus, the percentage of their loss that will 
be uncompensated under current law will be higher than for 
many more affluent residents. With fewer resources to manage 
their transition to some new affordable location, poor displacees 
may spiral downward in despair.1l° 
106. Victor P. Goldberg, Thomas W. Merrill &- Daniel Unumb, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Be-
tween Landlord and Tenant, 34 U.c.L.A. L. REV. 1083 (1987). 
107. United States v. Petty Motor, 327 U.S. 372, 381 (1945); Great Atlantic and 
Pacific Tea Co. v. State, 238 N.E. 2d 70S, 710 (1968). 
108. In the Matter of Dormitory Auth. of the State of New York, 699 N.Y.S. 2d 645, 
646 (Sup. Ct. 1999). 
109. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ave. Redevelopment Corp. v. One Parcel of Land, 670 
F.2d 289, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
110. The special nature of the harm suffered by low income displacees is shown in 
the detailed study of those displaced from SW Washington. Although, contrary to 
expectations, nearly all found displacees lived in decent housing, many suffered from 
social disorientation; they had lost a sense of community built up from having lived 
in stable social conditions for a long time. Researchers found that the sense of com-
munity had not been reestablished and that 114 of the interviewees had not made 
single friend since moving. Their sense of alienation was pervasive and there was 
such a "shocking" amount of anomie that a majority thought children should not be 
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The Constitution does not say "market value," is says "just 
compensation." The goal is to put the owner "in as good a posi-
tion pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken."l11 The 
Supreme Court defines "just compensation" as compensation 
that is fair both to the owner and to the public that has to pay, 
but nearly always limits condemnees to the market value of the 
property confiscated. It is black letter law that compensation is 
measured by the loss to the owner rather than the gain to the 
public. Yet the Court itself acknowledges that using the market 
value standard "does not necessarily compensate for all the val-
ues an owner may derive from his property."112 
I need to consider further why these kinds of losses are not 
compensated, although they might be in a tort case. Of course, 
the condemnor by definition is not a wrongdoer, and the pay-
ment to the condemnee will come from the public fisc. At the 
same time, however, setting compensation nearer the actual costs 
to the residents will (theoretically) prevent excessive taking of 
their property. The focus has been limited to the value of the 
property lost rather than consequential damages. Plainly, this 
prefers those whose locational assets are capitalized in real estate 
to those whose assets consist of local knowledge, connections, 
and mutual affections. 
The explanation for this preference in the cases frequently is 
explained in terms of ease of measurement. 113 The Court will 
not compensate the subjective values that an owner may have for 
his, for example, ancestral home. The market value of a house is 
relatively straightforward, but determining the value of lost emo-
tional attachments is inherently unreliable and costly to investi-
gate. Perhaps the poor suffer more from not considering their 
intangible losses, since this may cause their losses to be entirely 
neglected. 
Some writers have suggested paying a premium above market 
value, say 150%, as a way to approximate their total loss through 
expropriation more closely. This is often defended as a way to 
take account of the compulsory nature of the taking without en-
gaging in unreliable inquiries into subjective value. A multiplier 
brought into this world. DANIEL THURSZ, WHERE ARE THEY Now? 100-01 (Health 
and Welfare Council of the National Capital Area 1966). Similar depression af-
flicted displacees from the West End of Boston after it was cleared in 1958-59. 
FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 63, at 34. 
111. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
112. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979). 
113. DANA & MERRILL, supra, note 4 at 175-77. 
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is no answer for the poor, however, since they will have little or 
nothing to mUltiply. Moreover, courts have not been receptive to 
incorporating such premiums in constitutional formulas. 
In Kimball Laundry, Justice Frankfurter justified the failure 
generally to compensate for subjective losses on three grounds: 
The value of property springs from subjective needs and attitudes; 
its value to the owner may therefore differ widely from its value to 
the taker. Most things, however, have a general demand which 
gives them a value transferable from one owner to another. As 
opposed to such personal and variant standards as value to the par-
ticular owner whose property has been taken, this transferable 
value has an external validity that makes it a fair measure of public 
obligation to compensate the loss incurred by an owner as a result 
of the taking of his property for public use. In view, however, of 
the liability of all property to condemnation for the common good, 
loss to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his 
unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss 
due to an exercise of the police power, is properly treated as part 
of the burden of common citizenship. Because gain to the taker, 
on the other hand, may be wholly unrelated to the deprivation im-
posed upon the owner, it must also be rejected as a measure of 
public obligation to requite for that deprivation.114 
The grounds here are objectivity, citizenship, and lack of public 
benefit. They are unconvincing either alone or together. First, 
while the price given by the market may provide a fair value in 
that it will be impersonal, the argument above has maintained 
tbat it leaves out values just as or more important to owners (as 
Frankfurter concedes) and unduly punishes the poor. This is 
most apparent in the case of poor, long term apartment 
residents.u5 
Second, he argues that loss of subjective value should be un-
derstood as a burden of citizenship like lost property value under 
the police power. The point is all rhetoric and no substance. 
Subjective values are far less likely to be diminished by zoning 
and environmental regulations than by eminent domain; regula-
tions generally do not deprive owners of possession nor prohibit 
114. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1,5 (1949). 
115. This can be seen clearly when the resident is displaced from a rent controlled 
unit from which statutorily he cannot be evicted at the end of his term. See In the 
Matter of Dormitory Auth. of the State of New York, 699 N.Y.S. 2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 
1999). 
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established land uses that are not nuisances.116 Displacement of 
residents by police power regulations is rare and usually neces-
sary for the safety of the residents.117 It falls more readily on 
underdeveloped land, limiting future choices for development 
and thus affecting market value far more than subjective 
value.118 More broadly, Justice Frankfurter offers no argument 
for why bearing subjective losses falls within the duties of citizen-
ship while bearing market losses does not. 
Third, the lack of public benefit in extinguishing subjective val-
ues argues for, rather than against, compensating them. To the 
extent that the requirement for compensation should be thought 
of as encouraging more efficient decisions to take property, be-
cause decision makers must take the costs into account in weigh-
ing the benefits of an expected redevelopment, ignoring 
subjective losses threatens to prompt takings that inflict more net 
harm than good. This likelihood is increased to the extent that 
subjective loss usually will not have offsetting public benefits. Fi-
nally, it is a fundamental principle that compensation is mea-
sured by what the property owner has lost rather than by what 
the government has gained. 
Thus, some additional payments to poor residents, indepen-
dent of the market value of the property taken, seem demanded 
both by fairness and by efficiency. My suggestion is that all re-
sidents displaced by eminent domain be entitled constitutionally 
to moving expenses and home loss payments, which the con-
demning authority can measure using some statutory formula 
based on the number of persons in a household. The court could 
in its constitutional interpretation require that "just compensa-
tion" compel that such losses be addressed and assess whether 
statutory formulas are adequate on their face, but need not as-
sess whether they correctly compensate for subjective losses in 
specific cases. 
116. The protection of non·conforming uses from zoning changes reflects the 
law's reluctance to prohibit established uses. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. 
BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS, 222-24 (Aspen Law and Business 2d ed. 2000). 
117. A great furor erupted when the District of Columbia forced the evacuation 
by generally poor residents of an apartment building in scandalous physical condi-
tion. See Carol D. Leonnig, Tenants' suit Accuses D.C. of Prejudice in Evictions; 
Gentrification Causes Ouster Hispanics Say, Wash. Post, April 14, 2004. 
118. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978)(1oss of air rights for new construction not a taking when owner retains sub-
stantial economic use that represents its chief expectation); Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)(1osses from new zoning regulation on 
undeveloped land borne by owner). 
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Persons displaced by federal or federally assisted projects since 
1970 are entitled by statute to payments for moving and other 
expenses.119 Many states also provide statutory compensation to 
residents in excess of fair market value. California, for example, . 
pays for actual moving expenses and additional payments to 
make up the difference between the market value of the property 
taken and the cost of a comparable replacement dwelling or 
rental,120 The ability to administer such a program at the federal 
level would seem to undercut concerns about administrative ca-
pacity or fairness. 
Paying the costs of resident relocation may not address the 
pain suffered from the compulsory displacement from home and 
community. In England, where all rights to compensation are 
provided by statute, displaced residents are entitled to "home 
loss payments" determined by formula,,121 The courts have made 
it clear that the purpose of home loss payments is "to make some 
compensation to a man [sic] for the loss of his home as opposed 
to the loss of any interest he might have had in the particular 
dwelling which he formerly occupied."122 If a tenant is displaced 
who has no legal interest in remaining in his dwelling, the tenant 
has no claim to home loss payments, but may have a claim for 
"disturbance payments," which will pay moving expenses.123 
While this does not get at all of the elements of loss suffered, it 
may be a reasonable and easily applicable surrogate that will 
119. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 
42 U.S.c. 4622 (2004), provides: 
Whenever a program or project to be undertaken by a displacing agency will 
result in the displacement of any person, the head of the displacing agency shall 
provide for the payment to the displaced person of-
(1) actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, business, farm op-
eration, or other personal property; 
(2) actual direct losses of tangible personal property as a result of moving or 
discontinuing a business or farm operation, but not to exceed an amount equal to 
the reasonable expenses that would have been required to relocate such property, 
as determined by the head of the agency; 
(3) actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement business or farm; 
and 
(4) actual reasonable expenses necessary to reestablish a displaced farm, non-
profit organization, or small business at its new site, but not to exceed $10,000. 
120. CAL. Gov. CODE §§7262-64 (2005). 
121. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY, 1115 (Aspen Publishers 5th 
ed. 2002). See generally JEREMEY ROWAN-ROBINSON & CLIVE BRAND, COMPUL-
SORY PURCHASE AND COMPENSATION 235-41 (Gaunt Inc. 1995). 
122. R. V. Corby District Council ex p. McLean, 1 W.L.R. 735,736 (1975), quoted 
in Rowan-Robinson and Brown, Id. at 235-6. 
123. !d. at 241-46. 
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cause decision makers to weigh the losses that they are inflicting 
on displacees and afford them more just compensation when 
they do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent complaints about the use of eminent domain to rede-
velop urban areas properly raise concerns about displaced re-
sidents. Proposals and decisions restricting the purposes for 
which condemnation may be used, however, both are wrong in 
principle and attack a problem distinct from the losses that raise 
the concern in the first place, while denying powers to govern-
ment necessary to overcome economic and social disadvantages. 
Poor residents will be better protected by requiring more formal, 
public consideration of whether taking residences is necessary 
and by using a measure for just compensation that captures more 
fully the losses they actually suffer. 
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